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"The question inevitably 
arises, 'How is it that nations 
composed of people who don't 
want war are continually 
fighting?' The answer is that 
opinion against war has been 
without adequate institutions 
to give it effect . . . . The im-
portant thing is to get the 
right kind of an institution 
started, even though it be in 
the most rudimentary form."1 
Idealistic attempts to con-
struct an institutional answer 
to the question Elihu Root 
posed have a history ap-
proaching the lengthy record 
of war.2 But for recent peace 
advocates of a legalistic orien-
tation, the continuing pres-
ence of international disorder 
results from the absence of en-
forceable international law. 
They contend that although 
few people acknowledge the 
sanity or legitimacy of a "might makes right" philosophy, force often be-
comes the eventual arbiter of international disputes because there is no 
supranational governmental authority capable of imposing its will upon 
the disputants. Thus they argue vigorously and coherently for the calm 
construction of an international sovereign. 
The fundamental problem of peace is the 
problem of sovereignty. The welfare, the 
happiness, the very existence of a miner in 
Pennsylvania, Wales, Lorraine or the Don 
Basin, a farmer in the Ukraine, the Argen-
tine, the American Middle West or the 
Chinese rice fields—the very existence of every 
individual or family in every country of the 
five continents depends upon the correct in-
terpretation and application of sovereignty. 
This is not a theoretical debate but a ques-
tion more vital than wages, prices, taxes, 
food or any other major issue of immediate 
interest to the common man everywhere, be-
cause in the final analysis, the solution to 
all the everyday problems of two thousand 
million human beings depends upon the 
solution of the central problem of war. And 
whether we are to have war or peace and 
progress depends upon whether we can create 
proper institutions to insure the security of 
the peoples. 
Emery Reves, The Anatomy of Peace 
(New York, 1946), 126 
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Thrust forward by the energy displayed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
this point of view attained unprecedented strength in the United States 
in the late 1940's and early 1950's; it found its most developed expression 
in the United World Federalists (UWF), a movement which fully in-
tended to actualize its motto, "world peace through world law." The 
story of the dramatic rise and fall of this movement, now almost forgot-
ten, is the sad account of how easily idealism regarding the rational 
handling of international affairs dissolved in the acidic and hysterical 
nationalism usually called McCarthyism. 
It is my contention that the failure of the UWF to retain its vigor as 
a political pressure group, much less achieve its goal, is partially attribu-
table to a characteristic weakness on the part of American liberals, a 
weakness which the present peace movement might keep in mind. For 
although Louis Hartz has argued convincingly that dominant American 
values are (and always have been) liberal, it is equally useful to take 
note of the argument of Arthur Ekirch, Jr., a historian who finds in the 
same history a chronicle of continual decline in liberalism. Reading 
both analyses, it is impossible not to notice that Hartz supports his case 
primarily with references to what our Jeffersons, Lincolns, Wilsons and 
Roosevelts believed while Ekirch refers to accounts of how they behaved 
when under extreme pressure. Both have given valid half-portraits. For 
the American liberal's dilemma, as defined in this analysis, involves an 
inability to put into practice what he sincerely preaches—concurrently 
believing in what he is doing while he actively negates principles he 
would not consider denying.3 
Thus the American liberal accepts Locke's contentions regarding the 
individual's claim to what has been guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. 
But he also values what he chooses to call pragmatism. And this value, 
in the opinion of this liberal, often comes into direct conflict with all 
the others, a clash usually discussed in terms of idealism versus realism. 
Representing a significant weakness in the liberal mentality, the belief 
that liberal values cannot stand up under stress becomes a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. This handicaps liberal ideology during long periods of con-
tinual crisis—a state of affairs which the United States entered after 
World War II. 
It is significant, I think, that current criticism of American liberalism 
from those who call themselves radical is based on a rejection of recent 
liberal behavior rather than a new set of ideals or goals. Noticing a 
marked discrepancy between stated belief and observable action, radicals 
are contending that liberals are hypocrites or cynics. Self-induced para-
lytics, I believe, would be a more accurate description. For this diagnosis 
makes the illness psychosomatic, arguing that a dying mentality could 
yet recover if it changed its mind about itself, accepted the revolutionary 
implications of its own ideology and decided that stressful periods of 
rapid social change are times in which liberalism can be practical. 
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The history of the UWF, then, becomes a case study in the tradi-
tional way American ideals are suspended "for the duration" of periods 
demanding "realism." After arguing that the American experiment in 
self-government could now be given universal application, after having 
based a case for world federalism upon the demonstrable failure of the 
nation-state, the UWF responded to a nationalistic attack from those 
who would conserve rather than extend the "American Way of Life" by 
diluting its argument into a plea for support of the United Nations, based 
on the contention that it was the best tool available to a United States 
wishing to restrain an aggressive, atheistic, conspiratorial and com-
munistic Soviet Union. 
According to UWF analysis, the basic threat to humanity was nation-
alism. Thus nationalists—whether Stalinists or Sons and Daughters of 
the American Revolution—could have been attacked ideologically, using 
the armaments of recent history to destroy an archaic concept of patriot-
ism. Instead, the UWF indulged in the "More American Than Thou" 
battle which it waged skillfully enough to keep itself off lists of subversive 
organizations. But the taint of having been accused remained, and in the 
very waging of the battle the UWF conceded defeat in the war for the 
minds of men which were to be purged of the poison of nationalism. The 
ideal, which was originally intended to subvert an entrenched national 
patriotism, was sold by the organization for a conservative mess of con-
tainment during a period which, according to that organization, de-
manded political leaps across ideological chasms—and all in the name of 
pragmatism. 
II 
This war had been fought before and very largely on the same 
grounds. Assuming that the nation-state had been created to protect 
its citizenry from internal chaos and external attack, pressures which 
culminated in World War I were sufficient to convince many political 
theorists that nation-states could no longer fulfill their function. Ameri-
cans, tending to look back into their own history for organizational solu-
tions, saw their Constitution as a transformation of a struggling con-
federacy into a vigorous federation, a modification of a political 
institution which geared it toward survival. In 1910 Theodore Roosevelt 
advised the Nobel Committee that the United States Constitution was 
a useful model for "a species of world federation for international peace 
and justice."4 Typically, Americans during this period began to organize 
themselves into "action" groups intent upon bringing this ideal into 
existence—just as had been done in 1787. 
Two years before Roosevelt's pronouncement, the American School 
Peace League started circulating literature aimed at teaching school 
children to view peace efforts as something more than antiwar reaction. 
Rational construction of a world legislature was to be seen as an aspect of 
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these children's future which they would accept as they began to see 
themselves as citizens of a world republic. Another educational organiza-
tion, the Peace and Arbitration League, was formed the same year. 
With Roosevelt as honorary chairman, it attempted to work toward the 
same goals through state congresses.5 
The UWF would later repeat both of these approaches, but in tactical 
terms its primary predecessor was the New York Peace Society, an organi-
zation formed in 1906 and headed by Andrew Carnegie. This group was 
soon completely oriented toward internationalism, forming subsidiary 
organizations such as the World-Federation League (1910) and the 
League to Enforce Peace (1914). As Warren F. Kuehl, the historian of 
these movements, describes the World-Federation League, he also an-
ticipates the later position of the UWF. For it too "sought, not to change 
existing nations or to intrude upon their domestic concerns, but 'only to 
lessen the occasions of war' and to hasten 'the day of establishment of 
some form of central government empowered to keep the peace/ "6 
Having faded in importance, the World-Federation League was re-
placed by the League to Enforce Peace, an organization which anticipated 
the problems of later federalists by being plagued with splintering 
differences of opinion.7 For its concept of a world government involved 
the potential use of military sanctions against a national offender, a 
prospect offending many pacifistic supporters of world law who con-
sequently favored the more gentle and evolutionary aspirations of the 
World's Court League.8 By the time the war was over, internationalists 
began to see their dream of federation as at least temporarily Utopian.9 
But with the decision to accept a confederation, The League to Enforce 
Peace split on whether or not to accept a League of Nations "with reser-
vations." William Howard Taft accepted the reservation on Article 10, 
but his position was rejected by the rest of an Executive Committee 
which wanted to retain him as its president.10 At this point, the World's 
Court League merged with the New York Peace Society to form the 
League of Nations Union, a group which supported Woodrow Wilson.11 
Many other organizational attempts preceded the UWF commitment 
to internationalization of the American mentality. Efforts by the Wood-
row Wilson Foundation, the Foreign Policy Association, the Council on 
Foreign Relations, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the 
American Union for Concerted Peace Efforts and the Commission to 
Study the Organization of Peace are all cited by Robert A. Divine as 
contributing to "The Triumph of Internationalism in America During 
Woi~ld War II."12 More specifically, the last group listed, chaired by 
James T. Shotwell, represented a preview of UWF arguments by declar-
ing in 1941 that "the present conflict has taught us that something at 
once stronger and more adjustable than the League of 1919 is necessary. 
National sovereignty must yield more and more to the community of 
nations. The world must evolve from League to federation."13 
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However, instead of evolving into a federation, the League of Na-
tions became merely the United Nations. Instead of shaping world 
opinion into a perspective which saw clearly the insanity of modern war-
fare, these groups only reflected tendencies toward social disorganization. 
Kuehl concludes that the participants in the earlier movements may have 
"believed so strongly in the inevitability of their success that they 
thought it unnecessary to combine in more than a temporary move-
ment/'14 
III 
The UWF may have learned something from previous failures, be-
cause it did represent an attempted coalition of likeminded movements. 
But it too believed success to be inevitable and largely for the reasons 
argued by its predecessors. Federalists had traditionally argued that their 
ideas had to be possible because all other options seemed to be closed or 
closing. Shocked by the incapacity of the League of Nations to prevent 
a second world war, Denna F. Fleming articulated most of the later UWF 
arguments for world federation in a speech given in 1943 which con-
cluded: "We are moving towards World Federation because untold 
millions of people are learning that the Nation State can no longer 
protect them."15 
These millions included political leaders, members of the intellectual 
community and the common citizenry. In 1946 fifty-three of the sixty-five 
candidates for the Eightieth Congress who answered a questionnaire 
approved of changing the United Nations into a world federation with 
majority rule legislation. Two more approved with qualifications, while 
seven disapproved and three were undecided.16 And in his annual 
message to Congress, President Truman chose that year to say: "The 
United Nations Organization now being established represents a minimal 
essential beginning. It must be developed rapidly and steadily . . . . Our 
ultimate security requires more than a process of consultation and 
compromise. It requires that we begin now to develop the United Na-
tions organization as the representative of the world as one society."17 
Similarly, a poll conducted by Arthur Kornhauser of the Columbia 
University Bureau of Applied Social Research reported that not one 
person of all the editors, historians, political scientists and church leaders 
deemed expert on international affairs "suggested that America should 
turn its back on the world and keep out of global organizations, as it did 
after the last war."18 According to this poll, informed debate concerned 
only how soon international sovereignty could be achieved, with eleven 
percent thinking it could come within five years. 
Perhaps more surprisingly, a Gallup poll taken in 1946 indicated that 
the man in the street was not far behind his leaders. It noted that in 
stark contrast to the isolationist mood which followed World War I, 
fifty-two percent of the American public favored United States participa-
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tion in the liquidation of national armed forces, with an international 
police force to be given the responsibility of keeping the peace. Only 
twenty-four percent were opposed to this, with twenty-two percent still 
undecided.19 
Riding this groundswell of public opinion, five of the groups dedi-
cated to world government convened in February, 1947, in North Carolina 
and combined to form the United World Federalists For World Govern-
ment With Limited Powers Adequate To Prevent War. Further identify-
ing their mutual aim as "to mobilize popular opinion and action toward 
world government so that the local and national representatives of the 
people will be impelled to world federation by an irresistible political 
force,"20 these groups—Americans United for World Government, World 
Federalists, Massachusetts Committee for World Federation, Student 
Federalists and World Citizens of Georgia—announced the following 
credo: 
We believe that peace is not merely the absence of war but 
the presence of justice, of law, of order—in short, of govern-
ment and the institutions of government; that world peace 
can be created and maintained only under world law, uni-
versal and strong enough to prevent armed conflict between 
nations.21 
The growth of the new organization was immediate and striking. By 
November of 1948, Cord Meyer, Jr., the President of the UWF during its 
early years, was able to announce the expenditure of $550,000 in an 
expansion program involving the development of the already existing 
six hundred chapters in the United States toward the goal of one chapter 
in every community.22 Earlier that year, in a letter to the editor of the 
New York Times, Meyer was eager to cite a new poll conducted by Roper 
which showed an increase in public support to sixty-three percent for 
the UWF proposal that the United States initiate action to change a 
weak United Nations confederation into a strong federation.23 
By 1948, Robert Lee Humber, a North Carolina attorney who 
operated as a one man UWF lobby on the state government level, had 
succeeded in persuading sixteen state legislatures to pass resolutions ask-
ing the federal government to officially support world federalization.24 
And that fall the voters of Connecticut approved the UWF position in a 
referendum attached to the Presidential election by a vote of 130,548 to 
11,467—thus exceeding the nine to one margin which had endorsed the 
UWF in an earlier referendum in Massachusetts.25 
The total membership of the constituent groups at the time of the 
formation of the UWF was approximately 18,000.26 But by 1949 there 
were forty-five thousand members paying three dollars annual dues in 
720 local chapters.27 In June of that year, eight thousand people came 
to Madison Square Garden for a UWF rally in support of a Congressional 
resolution which advocated the official announcement by the State De-
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partment that the goal of American foreign policy involved the develop-
ment of the United Nations into a world federation.28 The chief speaker 
of the evening was Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, followed 
by Cord Meyer, Jr. and Senator Charles W. Tobey, the man who joined 
with twenty-one others to sponsor the resolution in the Senate and who 
was supported by over one hundred committed sponsors in the House of 
Representatives.29 
What happened? Two decades later, Americans are still living in the 
United States; the United Nations is neither universal nor capable of 
keeping its members from fighting each other; and the planet seems to 
be no closer to planetary government than it was three world wars ago. 
If the UWF failed, was this failure based on inadequate theory, tactical 
error or events outside its control? 
These questions cannot be conclusively answered, especially with 
respect to events outside the control of the UWF (such as Soviet be-
havior), because how history might have been cannot be documented. 
However, with the acknowledged benefit of hindsight, both tactical and 
theoretical weaknesses can be identified which now seem to have pre-
cluded any possibility of success; and these weaknesses have a direct 
bearing on how the USSR could reasonably have been expected to react 
to the prospect of world federation. 
World federalists could never quite believe they were right. They 
argued that a world federation was absolutely and immediately possible 
and that anything less was suicidal; but, they decided in the meantime 
they would support the United Nations. The liberal's inability to be-
lieve his own rhetoric is closely associated, I contend, with his suspicion 
that his ideals are not built to withstand stress. This ambivalence in 
theory leads to tactical cowardice, a combination which makes short 
range relief look like a pragmatic purchase of time. The effect can be 
seen in the general haplessness of American liberalism after World War 
II and in the more specific decline of the UWF as a viable political 
group. This virtual disappearance of the UWF from the political scene 
is symbolized quite graphically in capsule form by the career of Cord 
Meyer, Jr.—a sad parable of the Ail-American Boy who tried to live to 
the liberal hilt the American Way of Life in the 1940,s and 1950's. 
Meyer, who graduated from Yale (Phi Beta Kappa, goalie on the 
hockey team) in 1942, joined the Marines, lost an eye on Guam, returned 
in 1945 to wed Mary E. Pinchot (daughter of Amos, niece of Gifford) 
and to be Harold Stassen's aide at the founding of the United Nations. 
In 1947 he wrote Peace or Anarchy and founded the UWF. In 1951 the 
UWF publication, The Federalist, announced: "Because he has under-
taken a U. S. Government post, Cord Meyer, Jr. is unable to continue as 
honorary president of UWF or as a member of UWF's Executive 
Council."30 Personifying the way the UWF had begun to support rather 
than castigate the American variety of nationalism, Meyer had joined 
115 
the CIA. Sheltered from the heat of McCarthyism by Allen Dulles, he 
became the agent who slipped subsidies to the National Student Associa-
tion and other left-liberal organizations.31 
He served for sixteen years an organization which has a world 
government orientation differing significantly from that of the UWF; 
and it is now possible to consider the Soviet evaluation of Meyer when 
he was launching the UWF remarkably prescient and atypically humor-
ous. For in 1949 Meyer had said: "Moscow radio has spent some time 
attacking us, and it attacked me personally not so long ago as the fig leaf 
of American imperialism; I think that was the nice phrase used."32 
IV 
The unhappy ending of Meyer's story was not, I think, implicit in 
its beginning. The ideas of post-World War II federalists, presented by 
Meyer in sketchy fashion in Peace or Anarchy, were too benevolent to be 
imperialistic and too obvious to benefit from fig leaves. As indicated 
above, these ideas had been advanced before, but they seemed to make 
a lot more sense to many Americans in the late Forties. The title of 
Meyer's books stated the alternatives, and since international anarchy 
was widely assumed to imply the impending extinction of the human 
race, the base from which world federalists built their case was the con-
viction that there was really no other choice. According to Meyer, the 
immediate future was going to entail either world government or total 
chaos via atomic warfare; the world was obviously not unified enough for 
a unitary form of government, so only federalism seemed to represent a 
viable system which could both assert power in its limited realm (pre-
vention of international war) and acknowledge the cultural and economic 
differences of member states.33 
It is almost impossible to exaggerate the importance of the feeling 
that there were no alternatives to federalism. As early as 1943, Norman 
Cousins had editorialized that "one of the greatest obstacles to world 
citizenship today is the lack of a world consciousness that the ideal is 
not only possible but mandatory if we are not to slide into a long period 
of retrogression."34 But the driving force behind the sentiment that 
world federalism was "the only visible alternative to mass suicide" was 
clearly the bombing of Japan, an event which suddenly made the UWF 
seem less Utopian than earlier federalists.35 Witness Henry Stimson and 
Vernon Nash: "Now, with the release of atomic energy, man's ability to 
destroy himself is very nearly complete. The bombs dropped on Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki ended a war. They also made it wholly clear that 
we must never have another war. This is the lesson men and leaders 
everywhere must learn, and I believe that when they learn it they will 
find a way to lasting peace. There is no other choice."36 "There is now 
no other choice possible; it is either the Utopia of world government or 
the cataclysm of an atom-germ-poisons third world war."37 
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Within the negative thrust of this "no other choice" stance, moreover, 
is the concurrent belief that world federalist recommendations are, in-
deed, viable options. Reflecting a faith in man's ability to change his 
institutions when necessary, Meyer contended that the current emphasis 
on "preparedness," while mandatory because of the absence of law in 
governing international relations, was bound to lead to the sort of 
totalitarian state America was supposedly insuring itself against. "Pre-
paredness in foreign policy means the subordination of economic con-
siderations to political and military goals. The implementation of such 
a policy seems to necessitate the strictest governmental regulation of 
foreign trade and the use of tariffs and quotas as weapons. The effect 
must be further centralization of power within the United States . . . ,"38 
Ironically, Meyer sharply cirticized the sort of government which 
needed to hide its activities from its own citizens: "To Americans, the 
existence of the Russian secret police is the most damning indictment 
against the Soviet state."39 However, this is not to argue that Meyer was 
an early Cold Warrior. In an interpretation which would shortly appear 
seditious and which has only recently been extensively accepted, Meyer 
refused to make a bogey of the Soviet Union, saying that the increasing 
hostilities were the fault of both countries and chiefly the result of 
nationalism.40 
The other central propagator of UWF ideas, and the man who be-
came the spokesman for the movement when Meyer dropped out of 
sight, was Norman Cousins. Using his editorial page as a useful podium, 
Cousins wrote many defenses of federalist positions in the Saturday Re-
view of Literature, often giving other advocates such as Clement Attlee, 
Joseph S. Clark and Oscar Hammerstein II a chance for guest editorials.41 
Associated with federalist movements long before the creation of the 
UWF, Cousins wrote in 1945: "For the last five years, the editors of The 
Saturday Review have dedicated this page to the principles of world 
citizenship. We have no intention of abandoning that fight—now or at 
any other time."42 
Indeed, Cousins did not abandon the fight. It seems fair to say that 
his value to the movement was not (and is not) in developing new and 
fresh ideas, but in the dogged effort to keep the issue before the public, 
trying to arouse that irresistible movement which was to sweep the world 
toward sanity. 
But resistance was forthcoming, for Cousins and Meyer were not 
universally convincing when they attempted to project the concepts of 
The Federalist Papers onto the twentieth-century situation. Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr. believed that our "national unity results less from the 
Constitution than from Civil War."43 Harold Bradley argued that a 
sense of community is necessary before any sort of federalism is feasible, 
and that this sense was present in post-revolutionary America but almost 
totally absent on a world scale after World War II.44 In a more recent 
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analysis, John W. Spanier summed up this position with the conclusion 
that the world federalists never had a theoretical chance: 
In short, world government is not acceptable even as a 
theoretical answer to the problem of our time—and cannot 
be until a global consensus exists. Only then can the con-
flicts among national interests be resolved more peacefully. 
Only then will a world government acquire the legitimacy 
necessary for the obedience of its laws—laws that are the 
product of political rather than judicial decisions. It is 
precisely the absence of such consensus today that explains 
the survival of sovereign states and the high expectation of 
violence.45 
In the Forties and Fifties, people of this persuasion were very much 
attracted to the ideas of Clarence K. Streit, a man who argued for Union 
Now: A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Democracies of the North 
Atlantic. The Atlantic Union movement, which grew out of Streit's 
work and which claimed that federation of likeminded democracies was 
immediately possible, had appreciable support in Congress (from 
Senator Kefauver and Representative Judd).46 It had support as well 
in the general public.47 This group, which became the chief federalist 
competition of the UWF, essentially responded to the contention that 
no other choice was possible by negating the possibility of world federal-
ism: "To dismiss regionalism in favor of an abstract idea of a world 
government would be to ignore realities and engage in search of perfect 
solutions in an imperfect world."48 It would be, in short, idealistic in-
stead of realistic. 
But advocacy of regional alignment had disastrous overtones for 
those who were hoping to avoid the sort of perpetual war between blocs 
which Orwell envisioned in 1984. F. L. Schuman contended that fed-
eralism of this sort would be more likely to cause conflict than to pre-
vent or ameliorate it. And as Chester Bowles saw it: "The purpose of 
world government is not to bring Russia and America together; the 
purpose of the world government is to keep them apart . . . . In the 
absence of a superior force, each seeks the security that can be obtained 
only at the expense of what the other regards as its own security . . . ,"49 
Alan Cranston, speaking as President of the UWF in 1950, cautioned 
against those who conceive of government as feasible only "over like-
minded peoples. This, I submit, is a common misconception of the 
whole purpose of government. In my simple definition, government 
(which nobody likes) is only instituted by people who have to live to-
gether and find it difficult to do so peacefully."50 
Since both regional and world federalists ultimately desired the same 
sort of world order, the debate over whether government must precede 
or follow a sense of community was reduced to a difference in tactics-
immediate universalism versus gradualism. Einstein contended that 
"the trouble about taking little steps, one at a time, in the hope of 
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reaching that ultimate goal is that while they are being taken, we 
continue to keep the bomb secret without making our reason convincing 
to those who do not have the secret."51 And in the most picturesque 
portrayal of the inefficiency of gradualism, F. L. Schuman quoted Lloyd 
George to the effect that "nothing is more dangerous than to try to leap 
a chasm in two jumps."52 Therefore, in its first General Assembly, the 
UWF proclaimed its opposition to the Union Now point of view: "We 
dissociate ourselves most explicitly from those who would exclude the 
Soviet Union or who would welcome her unwillingness to join [a world 
federation]."53 
However, when confronted with an organization which presented it-
self as a body which might eventually develop into real world govern-
ment, the UWF was in a quandry regarding whether or not to believe 
what it had been saying about gradualism. On the one hand, its state-
ment of beliefs included an endorsement of "the efforts of the United 
Nations to bring about a world community favorable to peace."54 And 
Chester Bowles maintained that the work of the UWF was to give "blood 
and bones" to UN efforts.55 Yet, in Peace or Anarchy, Meyer indicated 
agreement with Emery Reves' powerful polemic against the nation-state, 
The Anatomy of Peace, in which a case was made that the UN, if a half 
step at all, was in the wrong direction. According to Reves, the sover-
eignty of member nations was only emphasized in the way the General 
Assembly was constructed, with organizational ineffectiveness guaranteed 
by giving members of the security council the power to veto decisions.56 
Along the same lines, E. B. White, who had long argued the federalist 
cause within the New Yorker, "ridiculed the proposed world organiza-
tion as the 'Fifty Sovereign Nations of the World Solemnly Sworn to 
Prevent Each Other from Committing Aggression.' "57 
This theoretical dispute among federalists was not resolved by fed-
eralists; it was overwhelmed by nationalistic opposition to the whole 
concept of yielding national sovereignty to any supranational organiza-
tion. Unfortunately for the public relations campaign directed by Meyer 
and Cousins, the mood in America changed drastically during the Fifties; 
and theoretical considerations once again took second place during a 
period when good tactics seemed to involve back-pedalling for one's 
organizational life. In 1951 the UWF had an income of over $180,000— 
obtained from about forty thousand members; but within five years 
these figures had shrunk to about $65,000 and 17,000 respectively.58 A 
closer examination of the UWF reaction to the attack launched by 
nationalists leads to the conclusion that instead of opting for the politics 
of "pragmatism" the group would have been well advised to remain 
idealistic. As Norman Cousins has more recently concluded, the UWF 
"was strongest when its message was purest."59 In evaluating reasons for 
its present condition, then, it becomes important to note that UWF sale-
men were responsible for the adulteration of the product. 
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V 
In 1950 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard testimony 
branding the UWF as subversive from witnesses representing societies 
such as: Women's Patriotic Council on National Defense, National 
Society of New England Women, National Society of Women Descend-
ants of the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company, Dames of the 
Loyal Legion of the United States of America, The American Coalition, 
The Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the Society of the War of 1812.60 
Also in 1950, the prolific Joseph P. Kamp published a book with the 
caustic title: We Must Abolish These United States.61 Asserting that 
this was the essential message of the UWF, he provided lists of those in 
Congress who had traitorously supported UWF proposals in the past. 
One by one, the state legislatures began to pass memorials remanding 
their earlier endorsements. In the reconsidered opinion of the Senate of 
the Virginia General Assembly, "it appeared world government 'would en-
tail the surrender of national sovereignty.' "62 By 1952 the Senate Ap-
propriations Committee, under the leadership of Pat McCarran, approved 
a bill banning funds from any organizations which "directly or indirectly 
promoted one world government or world citizenship."63 This particular 
attack was directed against UNESCO, but the UWF received its full share 
of special attention. Thus, when a Methodist minister, guilty of form-
ing a UWF chapter, was accused of aiding the communist cause, the 
charge was vigorously refuted by The Federalist.6* Cranston, as Presi-
dent, found it necessary to deny that the UWF "stinks of Communist 
Government" and went so far as to maintain that they were barred from 
membership.65 
The Fifth General Assembly (June, 1951) found students splitting 
off from the UWF to form their own organization. However, rather than 
rejecting their elders' consuming concern with communist infiltration, 
these dissidents were interested in a larger share of the funds. So the 
credo which the younger universalists issued reflected rather than cor-
rected the conflict between theory and behavior being acted out by older 
idealists. Those who were forced to live in a world full of communists 
proposed to expel them from an organization devoted to world unity—in 
the name of American liberalism: 
As Americans, as student federalists and as citizens of the 
world, we believe . . . that we must displace from any leader-
ship in this movement for freedom the communists whose 
methods would destroy freedom; that we must preserve and 
expand freedom at home, combatting tendencies to limit 
traditional liberties in times of crisis.66 
The close connection between panicky tactics and dilution of theory 
is demonstrated by the fact that although the 1950 General Assembly 
had reaffirmed the UWF belief in universalism, the convention in 1951 
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adopted an endorsement of partial federation in case the USSR could not 
or would not participate in a world federation.67 
It is possible to criticize the UWF for its feeble defensiveness. Doubt-
less, better tactics would have involved reacting as vigorously as did 
Truman when he was criticized by the VFW for appointing federalist 
T. K. Finletter as Secretary of the Air Force. Truman's response was a 
healthy defense of his own personal choice, but it also indicated some-
thing of the shrinking status of the UWF: "All this howl about organi-
zations a fellow belongs to gives me a pain in the neck. I'd be willing to 
bet my right eye that you yourself and I have joined some organizations 
that we wish we hadn't. It hasn't hurt me any and I don't think it has 
hurt you any . . . ,"68 
Norman Cousins, outraged at the effectiveness of the red-baiting, was 
perceptive enough to be self-critical under pressure: "There is a tendency 
to deny every charge just because a charge is made, rather than affirming 
our own beliefs and carrying the fight to the open arena where public 
opinion can be rallied behind us."69 But Cousins, who became President 
of the UWF in 1952, responded to an attack upon his own position from 
the right by conceding that the principal charge within that attack had 
validity; he too saw the ultimate threat to American liberalism coming 
from the fanatics on the left: "There could be no more ghastly irony 
than is presented today by those who in the name of Americanism are 
actually helping to prepare this country for the eventual triumph of 
Communism."70 
Hagerstown, Maryland, provided the setting for a dramatic presenta-
tion of the way the UWF under Cousins responded to charges of sub-
versive activity. Although the Junior Chamber of Commerce had agreed 
to co-sponsor a play entitled "The Myth," it was responsive to pressures 
from the American Legion and the UWF was forced to present the 
play without the support of other local organizations. At the close of 
the performance, Daniel Burkhardt, the American Legion Adjutant for 
the State of Maryland, asked for and received permission to present his 
views. According to The Federalist: 
Norman Cousins came to the stage and in answering 
Burkhardt's statements said, 'My real flag is the U.S. flag, 
but there must come a day when there is a banner to repre-
sent the human race.' Mr. Burkhardt then referred to the 
charge from the Un-American Activities Committee report 
that Cousins had spoken at a meeting of the Scientific and 
Cultural Conference for World Peace, a Communist-front 
meeting, in New York in 1949. Cousins replied that he had 
done so at the request of the State Department in order to 
present the United States' anti-Communist views, had been 
roundly booed and hissed and had needed police escort to 
leave the hall.71 
This can be read in a way not intended by the UWF publication. 
For it reveals that in 1949, before McCarthy, a leading founder of the 
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UWF was busy giving anti-communist speeches for the State Department 
of the nation into which he happened to have been born. Although he 
was the spokesman for a movement based on the theoretical ability of 
hostile people to live in peace, he flaunted as patriotic credentials the 
fact that he could not communicate with communists—a quality which 
might have produced mortification. One is forced to conclude that if 
Cousins' "real flag" was the United States flag, he was not buying what 
the UWF was selling. 
Perhaps more important, because of the dramatic curtain call, little 
attention was paid to the message of the play itself. The incident re-
ceived national publicity, but interest in the event was limited to the 
alleged subversiveness of the UWF. Thus "The Myth," the idea of world 
government, got lost in a dialogue which was essentially beside the point 
in much the same way as the original ideals of the UWF disappeared into 
the righteous rhetoric of the early Fifties. 
Defensive, rather than aggressively subversive, The Federalist cheered 
when a California high school teacher who had been called a com-
munist over the radio because of her UWF affiliations received over 
$50,000 damages in 1953.72 That same year Rev. Donald Harrington 
used the same publication to consider the possibility of a change in the 
USSR with the death of Stalin. He concluded: "Are the Soviets ready 
for peace? Only to the degree that it may serve the long range objective 
of world conquest which they have set forth."73 In 1956 Harrington be-
came President of the UWF. That year the General Assembly passed a 
platform which supported both "Self-Determination of Peoples" and 
"Halting Communist Expansion."74 Like the State Department they 
supported so consistently, the federalists of the Fifties could not imagine 
that these two principles might contradict each other, even though their 
own paper had reported that a vote in Vietnam would be "overwhelm-
ingly" for communism.75 
The Federalist during the early Sixties reads much the same way. In 
1961 a $50,000 gift from Cousins made possible the hiring of a profes-
sional public relations firm "to aid in the visibility program."76 The 
following year the organization attracted 3000 new members but lost 
2000 through non-renewal.77 That was the year in which the UWF 
President, Paul W. Walter (a former campaign manager for Robert A. 
Taft), sent three telegrams to President Kennedy congratulating him on 
his handling of the Cuban missile crisis.78 The most interesting unifica-
tion project discussed from September, 1963, through June, 1965, was 
a proposed merger with SANE. Although this represented an appreciable 
scaling down of earlier goals, most members felt it would be invigorating. 
But a committee set up to work out the details regarding each group's 
loss of individual identity was unable to do so.79 A letter from a member 
of both groups explains part of the problem involved: "I have noticed 
that UWF always, or almost always, stops short of criticism of a national 
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administration (whether Republican or Democratic). SANE does not 
restrain itself in this manner/'80 In 1964 the UWF gave a "Federalist 
Founders Award" to Everett Dirksen; in 1966 another went to Robert 
McNamara.81 
But by this time the membership was restive. McNamara's award was 
most bitterly disputed.82 Although the UWF was still red-baited oc-
casionally, the war in Vietnam was making open opposition to the 
United States government by American citizens much more popular. 
Thus in 1966 President C. M. Stanley began asking for a change in 
American foreign policy. He argued that merely containing communism 
was not enough; it was time for the United States (and the UWF) to 
begin moving positively again.83 The General Assembly of 1967 identified 
the American government as the primary problem in Southeast Asia, and 
the UWF became part of Negotiation Now!84 Its student branch, not to 
be outdone, displayed a President and Vice President who had turned in 
draft cards and held conventions featuring speakers such as Benjamin 
Spock, Joan Baez, David Harris and Herbert Marcuse.85 But having 
arrived with too little after most of the people were already there, the 
world federalists have been little noticed in the current peace movement. 
During recent years the UWF newsletter, The Federalist, has tended 
to consist largely of photographs of UWF dignitaries shaking hands with 
government dignitaries, photographs of UWF delegates congratulating 
each other at banquets, and reproductions of telegrams sent by the UWF 
to encourage support of the United Nations. In 1970 it was decided to 
cease the publication of this newsletter as a separate entity. What had 
been called the United World Federalists (UWF) is now labeled the 
World Federalists of the United States of America (WFUSA). But these 
do not represent particularly meaningful motions within the recently 
stagnant peace movement.86 
VI 
The nice phrase Cord Meyer, Jr. had used to describe the early UWF 
involved seeing the organization as the vanguard of an "irresistible 
political force.'' This force having been easily resisted by a diversionary 
offensive on the part of nationalists, federalist liberals have retreated 
from the realm of activist movements to the security of academic impact 
and influence. In 1958 the first edition of Grenville Clark's and Louis B. 
Sohn's World Peace Through World Law was published, with later re-
visions appearing in 1960 and 1966. This book, called the "bible" for 
world federalists, amounts to a detailed restructuring of the United Na-
tions from a useless confederation into a viable federation.87 Among 
later federalist efforts, most notable is a series of volumes entitled The 
Strategy of World Order, edited by Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlo-
vitz. But although many positive things could be said about these pub-
lications, there is no doubt that they represent a lowering of the aspira-
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tions and a tempering of the optimism of the earlier UWF efforts. In-
stead of hastily organizing the avoidance of cataclysm, the UWF cur-
rently limits its activism to a lobbyist in Washington, with its primary 
emphasis now involving the more leisurely process of educating the 
children of those who missed a chance for world peace through world 
law after World War II. If this is wiser, it is also sadder. According to 
a UWF chapter head, D. M. H. Cowden, "Many believed—in the euphoria 
of the post-war period—that world government was imminent. Age has 
altered our ideology over the years."88 
This would appear to be accurate, if understated. From an organiza-
tion which once had 60,000 members (according to Cowden) to one 
with only 15,000 during the depths of the Fifties, the UWF has managed 
to recoup its losses only minimally, counting now about 20,000 paying 
adherents. So the history of the aspirations and accomplishments of the 
UWF, in a world far from federalized, has to be considered an account 
of failure. Official UWF publications do not concede this.89 Rev. G. G. 
Grant, S.J., has contended recently that whereas the early concerns of 
the group involved only the prevention of war via world government, by 
1965, "over and above the need for the elimination of war, there was 
recognized a parallel need for the development of those agencies that 
could alleviate hunger, disease and ignorance—the seeds of war."90 
Here is no more talk about leaps and chasms; having capitulated to 
the gradualists, the emphasis of the movement is upon "development" 
and "alleviation." If it is conceded that this falls far short of original 
goals, it is possible to conclude that federalist liberals degenerated as a 
vigorous political force because they failed to sterilize one of the seeds of 
their own destruction, an inability to believe what they heard themselves 
saying. 
Already in 1946 Sumner Welles had red-baited Einstein's argument 
for world government by contending that the United States and England 
should never agree to join a "World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," 
and thus "abolish all those cherished principles of individual liberty 
which are sacred to the Anglo-Saxon peoples."91 However, the Soviet 
Union had never endorsed the movement for world federation, and two 
years later a liberal journal in the United States could still give a 
liberal explanation of that sad fact by noting that Russia's suspicions of 
yet another capitalist plot were not merely reflections of paranoia. After 
all, argued the editor of the Christian Century, the USSR had been ex-
cluded, then admitted and then expelled from the League of Nations; 
and with the current structure of the United Nations, it was possible to 
see any attempt to deprive the Soviet Union of its veto as a step by the 
United States toward the possible legitimization of the use of atomic 
weapons against Russia by means of a vote within a General Assembly in 
which America controlled many more votes than the communist bloc 
could muster.92 
124 
From the very beginnings of the movement, however, publications 
which wished to give favorable accounts of the federalists did so by 
merely denying communist participation rather than by inquiring 
(with frustration and disappointment) why this was so. Newsweek, 
which noted contentedly that Norman Thomas represented the left edge 
of world government advocates, stated: 
The Communist fellow-traveling fringe, with one or two 
lonely exceptions, has kept aloof, obviously, because the 
official Communist party line frowns on the idea of world 
government as a 'reactionary Utopia/ It insists, in accordance 
with current Soviet policy, on the inviolability of national 
sovereignty. This means that for the time being, at least, 
the world-government movement is one of the few political 
currents of our time in which liberals can participate with-
out getting tangled up in Communist party intrigues and 
'front' maneuvers.93 
The logic of this is amazing. Communists, including the feeble 
American variety, are given the capability of destroying a "political 
current" merely by joining it, and yet the driving force of that current 
consists in its contention that we are all in the world together, until 
death does us part. 
According to the liberal mentality, if liberalism (being good) is not 
likely to do well during periods of extreme stress, communism (being 
evil) then approaches omnipotence. This seed of hysteria, cultivated by 
those concurrently claiming that there was no longer any choice but for 
disparate groups to trust each other, grew to the extent that when Mrs. 
Anita McCormick Blaine established the Foundation for World Gov-
ernment the fact that someone as far to the left as Henry Wallace was 
expected to be one of the trustees was enough to impel other organiza-
tions dedicated to unity to dissociate themselves. Ely Culbertson spoke 
for the Citizens Committee for United Nations Reform: "As far as our 
organization is concerned, anything Wallace is associated with is a red 
herring—doubled and redoubled."94 
Thus guilt by association was not the invention of the less than 
mediocre public servant who needed an issue on which to justify his own 
re-election. In fact, McCarthy could have discovered from the leadership 
of the UWF that "Soviet aggressive expansionism is the major problem 
in the world today."95 This spokesman made distinctions between the 
Soviet army and communism as a religion, but such subtleties were soon 
to be dropped as McCarthy became a fire-breathing symbol of much 
that liberals had conceded. By 1950 the same Truman administration 
which had nodded in the direction of world government in 1946 was 
issuing official proclamations which could just as well have been written 
by McCarthy himself: 
For if there is one thing that is clear, it is that the Soviet 
Union does not have, and has never had, the slightest in-
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tention of joining in any plan of world federation in any 
sense that would be acceptable to any believer in democracy. 
In fact, it is precisely because the Soviet Union has its own 
unbending ideas of how the entire world should be organ-
ized that the tensions exist today . . . . It is difficult to see 
how there can be a 'general agreement' with anyone whose 
single-minded objective is to extinguish you . . . . The 
objective of the free world is to erect a stone wall against 
aggression.96 
When the professional articulators of diplomacy begin to depend on 
the imagery of stone walls, it is easily seen that the federalists had failed 
to sterilize all the seeds of war. For this particular seed, a paralyzing 
preoccupation with communism, germinated in the liberal's lack of faith 
in his own ideology. It was then nourished by the tears shed in the 
pathetic liberal's lament that he was unfairly charged with communist 
sympathies; it grew into the rhetorical jungle of the Cold War. As 
liberal rejection of revolutionary change slid over into a defense of the 
status quo, all efforts toward change were given the label of revolutionary 
fungus and liberals broke out the defoliants. Tragically paralleling the 
larger movement in which American liberals became conservatives dur-
ing a period demanding rapid social change, a well financed, intelligent, 
internationalist peace movement succumbed to an obsolete and ignorant 
nationalism by sacrificing its ideals "for the duration" upon the altar of 
expediency, committing organizational suicide in the name of American 
pragmatism. 
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